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INTRODUCTION
[1]
Although not constitutionally required, it has become considerably
more commonplace for law enforcement to electronically record a
suspect’s custodial interrogation. This includes a complete recording,
beginning with the advice of rights and continuing through the end of the
interrogation. In fact, society now recognizes it as a useful, if not
necessary, tool for law enforcement.
[2]
Law enforcement officials initially resisted this investigative
technique. Today, however, many officials have come to see the
substantial benefits associated with the recording of a suspect’s custodial
interrogation. The usual reasons given in opposition to recording
confessions include concerns that the suspect will refuse to talk and
confessions will be lost, juries will be offended by the sometimes
necessary aggressive techniques used by the police to obtain a confession,
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the equipment will malfunction during an interrogation, and the high costs
associated with supplying a room with the necessary equipment.1
[3]
This change in law enforcement’s attitude towards electronic
recording of custodial interrogations has occurred for a number of reasons.
These include the notoriety associated with false confessions,2 concerns
about adequacy of the Miranda warnings, lawsuits filed against police
officers, enhanced investigations, reduction of suppression motions,
strengthening of the prosecutor’s case,3 increased guilty pleas,4 and
increased confidence by the public in the criminal justice system.5
Potential jurors expect that law enforcement will record a suspect’s
confession because the camcorder technology used for such recordings is
readily accessible and inexpensive. Jurors may wonder why a police
department failed to record something as significant as a defendant’s
confession, especially when the justice system requires jurors to consider
whether a confession was voluntary and reliable.

1

Lisa C. Oliver, Mandatory Recording of Custodial Interrogations Nationwide:
Recommending a New Model Code, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 263, 280–81 (2005).
2

It has been estimated that approximately fourteen to twenty-five percent of exonerations
based upon DNA testing involved false confessions. See Steven A. Drizin & Richard A.
Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891,
902 (2004); Innocenceproject.org, False Confessions & Mandatory Recording of
Interrogations, http://www.innocenceproject.org/fix/False-Confessions.php (last visited
Feb. 25, 2010) (stating that over twenty-five percent of convictions reversed through
DNA testing have involved false confessions).
3

See Oliver, supra note 1, at 283–84.

4

For example, in a survey of 246 police departments in Texas that have electronic
recording polices, over sixty-four percent indicated that recording confessions protects
police officers from claims of abuse by suspects, strengthens the prosecutor’s case, and
increases ability to focus on the investigation since the traditional need to take notes has
been significantly reduced. THE JUSTICE PROJECT, ELECTRONIC RECORDING OF
CUSTODIAL INTERROGATIONS IN TEXAS: A REVIEW OF CURRENT STATUTES, PRACTICES,
AND
POLICIES
2–3,
http://www.thejusticeproject.org/wp-content/uploads/texas_
recording_write-up.pdf.
5

MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-4-406 (2009).
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[4]
Over 500 jurisdictions have now enacted policies and procedures
requiring their officers to record confessions in certain circumstances.6 At
present, seventeen states and the District of Columbia have enacted such
requirements through the state legislature,7 court decision,8 amendment to
the state’s rules of evidence,9 or by court rules.10 Even in the states that
have not mandated recording, numerous police departments have
voluntarily instituted a policy requiring some type of recording
requirement.11
[5]
This Article will survey those states where law enforcement
personnel are required to electronically record a suspect’s post-arrest

6

See Innocenceproject.org, supra note 2.

7

See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 5-116.01 (2009); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 405/5-401.5,
5/103-2.1 (West 2009); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2803-B(1)(K) (2009); MD. CODE
ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 2-402 (West 2009); MO. ANN. STAT. § 590.700 (West 2009);
MONT. CODE. ANN. §§ 46-4-407(2), 46-4-408 (2009); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-4503
(2009); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-1-16 (West 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-211
(West 2009); 2009 OR. LAWS ch.488 (relating to custodial interrogations; creating new
provisions and amending OR. REV. STAT. § 165.540) (adopted June 24, 2009); TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22 § 3 (Vernon 2009); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 968.073,
972.115 (West 2009).
8

See Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1162 (Alaska 1985); State v. Hajtic, 724 N.W.2d
449, 454 (Iowa 2006); Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 813 N.E.2d 516, 533–34
(Mass. 2004); State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 591 (Minn. 1994); State v. Barnett, 789
A.2d 629, 632 (N.H. 2001). Contra Starks v. State, 594 So. 2d 187, 196 (Ala. Crim. App.
1991); People v. Holt, 937 P.2d 213, 241–43 (Cal. 1997); Coleman v. State, 375 S.E.2d
663, 664 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Kekona, 886 P.2d 740, 745–46 (Haw. 1994);
Brashars v. Commonwealth, 25 S.W.3d 58, 63 (Ky. 2000); State v. Thibodeaux, 750 So.
2d 916, 923 (La. 1999); Williams v. State, 522 So. 2d 201, 208 (Miss. 1988); State v.
Smith, 684 N.E.2d 668, 686 (Ohio 1997); Commonwealth v. Craft, 669 A.2d 394, 397
(Pa. 1995).
9

IND. R. EVID. 617(effective Jan. 1, 2011).

10

See, e.g., N.J. CT. R. 3.17.

11

THOMAS P. SULLIVAN, DEPARTMENTS THAT CURRENTLY RECORD A MAJORITY OF
CUSTODIAL
INTERROGATIONS
(2009),
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/
wrongfulconvictions/issues/Causesandremedies/falseconfessions/ PDDEPTLIST.pdf.

3

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XVI, Issue 3

statements. It will also compare, contrast, and consider the more
significant provisions commonly associated with this requirement. This
includes provisions regarding circumstances in which police must record a
statement, exceptions to the recording requirements, what the recording
must include, whether recording can be done without the suspect’s
knowledge, and the consequences for failure to record.
[6]
Part I will survey the District of Columbia and those states that
require the recording of custodial interrogations by statute. Part II will
review states where a judicial decision created the requirement. Parts III
and IV review those states that have created a recording requirement
through a rule of evidence and by court rule. Finally, parts V and VI will
conclude with a review of model legislation, as well as a review of
proposed legislation in Michigan.
I. LEGISLATIVE ACTION
A. District of Columbia
[7]
The recording statute in the District of Columbia is generally
straightforward and encompasses standard requirements found in many
other jurisdictions.12 A unique consequence of the recording requirement
is that the United States Attorney’s Office, which prosecutes local crimes
committed in the District of Columbia, must adhere to the recording
requirements when presenting cases in superior court.13 However, no such
requirement exists when that office prosecutes federal crimes in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia, because a federal recording
requirement does not currently exist.14
[8]
The Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) is required to record
custodial interrogations when interrogating a person suspected of

12

D.C. CODE § 5-116.01 (2009).

13
United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia: About Us,
http://www.justice.gov/usao/dc/ About_Us/index.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2010).
14

See generally infra note 211.
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committing a crime of violence15 and when the interrogation takes place in
a MPD interview room.16 In accordance with most other jurisdictions, the
MPD must record the advice of rights and the suspect’s response.17 This is
significant because it will have a substantial impact on litigation in which
the adequacy of the advice of rights and the voluntariness of a subsequent
waiver are in question.
[9]
If the suspect consents to questioning but does not want the
interview recorded, the statute permits the police to stop recording.18 A
statement obtained in violation of the statute results in a rebuttable
presumption that the statement is involuntary.19 Legislation creating a
presumption of involuntariness exists only in the District of Columbia and
Illinois.20 Although the presumption is rebuttable, it creates a potential, yet

15

Section 23-1331(4) defines crime of violence as
aggravated assault; act of terrorism; arson; assault on a police
officer (felony); assault with a dangerous weapon; assault with intent to
kill, commit first degree sexual abuse, commit second degree sexual
abuse, or commit child sexual abuse; assault with intent to commit any
other offense; burglary; carjacking; armed carjacking; child sexual
abuse; cruelty to children in the first degree; extortion or blackmail
accompanied by threats of violence; gang recruitment, participation, or
retention by the use or threatened use of force, coercion, or
intimidation; kidnapping; malicious disfigurement; manslaughter;
manufacture or possession of a weapon of mass destruction; mayhem;
murder; robbery; sexual abuse in the first, second, or third degrees; use,
dissemination, or detonation of a weapon of mass destruction; or an
attempt or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing offenses.

D.C. CODE § 23-1331(4).
16

Id. § 5-116.01(a)(1).

17

Id. § 5-116.01(b).

18

Id. § 5-116.01(c)(1).

19

Id. § 5-116.03.

20

725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/103-2.1(f) (2009).
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substantial, barrier for the government, and it appears to be inconsistent
with prevailing Supreme Court authority, as well as case law in the
District of Columbia. Ordinarily, the government is only required to
establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant made a
statement voluntarily.21 This statute increases the government’s burden of
proof to “clear and convincing evidence.”22
[10] The fact that the police did not record a confession does not mean
that it was coerced. The Supreme Court, as well as decisions in the District
of Columbia, has held that a statement is voluntary unless “the will of [the
defendant] was ‘overborne in such a way as to render his confession the
product of coercion.’”23 Moreover, this standard is inconsistent with the
rule that, when ascertaining the voluntariness of a statement, the trier of
fact must base the conclusion upon the totality of the circumstances,
without giving presumptive weight to any single factor, such as a failure to
record.24
B. Illinois
[11] Illinois requires the recording of custodial interrogations of murder
suspects when the questioning occurs in a detention facility, such as a
police station or a jail.25 However, there is no specific requirement to

21

Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972).

22

D.C. CODE § 5-116.03.

23

United States v. Thomas, 595 A.2d 980, 981 (D.C. 1991) (quoting Arizona v.
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 288 (1991)); see Davis v. United States, 724 A.2d 1163, 1168
(D.C. 1998).
24

The voluntariness of a confession is determined from “the totality of all the
surrounding circumstances –[considering] both the characteristics of the accused and the
details of the interrogation.” Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434 (2000)
(quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973)). By comparison, in
Massachusetts a failure to record is a factor to be considered on the issue of
voluntariness. Commonwealth v. DiGiamattista, 813 N.E.2d 516, 529 (Mass. 2004).

25
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/103-2.1(a)–(b) (West 2009) (“‘[C]ustodial interrogation’”
means any interrogation during which (i) a reasonable person in the subject's position
would consider himself or herself to be in custody and (ii) during which a question is

6
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record the advice of a suspect’s rights or the suspect’s response.26 As will
be discussed, most of the states require that the recording include the
advice of rights. The latter requirement is sound policy because it will be
easier for the parties to determine whether there has been compliance with
Miranda.
[12] Like many other jurisdictions, the Illinois statute provides
numerous exceptions to the recording requirement.27 A non-recorded
statement may be admissible if the prosecutor can prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence that an exception exists.28 These exceptions
include, but are not limited to, situations where recording was not
“feasible,”29 statements that bear on the credibility of the suspect as a
witness,30 spontaneous statements by the accused not made in response to
questioning,31 a suspect’s precondition that he will only make a statement
if it were not recorded,32 and a statement made at a time the interrogator is

asked that is reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.”). The statutory
definition tracks United States Supreme Court authority. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468
U.S. 420, 442 (1984); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 292 (1980). It has been
specifically held that the statute is not to be applied retroactively. People v. Amigon, 903
N.E.2d 843, 848 (2009).
26

See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/103-2.1(e).

27

See Id. 5/103-2.1(e).

28

Id. 5/103-2.1(e)(ix).

29

Id. 5/103-2.1(e)(ii).

30

Id. 5/103-2.1(e)(iii). For example, a defendant could not successfully move to keep his
statement out and subsequently be able to testify in a manner inconsistent with the
statement given to the police. This is consistent with the Fifth Amendment impeachment
jurisprudence where it has been held that the protections provided by Miranda cannot be
used as a basis to commit perjury. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971).
31

725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/103-2.1(e)(v). See generally Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S.
582 (1990).

32

Id. 5/103-2.1(e)(vi).
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unaware that a death has occurred.33 Even if the state cannot establish the
existence of an applicable exception, the statement may still be admissible
if it can pass a due process voluntariness analysis.34
[13] The penalties for failing to record are stricter in Illinois than in
many of the other jurisdictions surveyed. If the court finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that the interrogation should have been
recorded, the statute mandates that the statement “shall be presumed to be
inadmissible as evidence against the accused in any criminal proceeding . .
. .”35 This includes not only the non-recorded statement made by the
defendant, but also any statement made after the non-recorded statement,
even if the subsequent interrogation complies with the statute.36 This
presumption of inadmissibility may be overcome by a preponderance of
evidence “that the statement was voluntarily given and is reliable, based
upon a totality of circumstances.”37 If the statement is excluded, the only
permissible use of the statement is for impeachment purposes.38 As noted,
this is consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Harris v. New
York.39
C. Maine
[14] In 2004, Maine enacted legislation requiring police agencies to
create policies and procedures to deal with recording “interviews of
33

Id. 5/103-2.1(e)(viii). In People v. Armstrong, the court determined that this exception
applies when “(1) a death has occurred; and (2) the interrogators are aware of the death.”
919 N.E.2d 57, 70 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).

34

See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/103-2.1(f).

35

Id. 5/103-2.1(b).

36

Id. 5/103-2.1(d).

37

Id. 5/103-2.1(f). This comports with the voluntariness requirement required under the
Due Process Clause. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 434 (2000).

38

725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/103-2.1(d).

39

401 U.S. 222, 226 (2009); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/103-2.1(e)(iii).
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suspects in serious crimes.”40 The Maine Chiefs of Police developed a
model policy in February 2005.41 In 2006, the state mandated that all
police agencies “[adopt] written policies” to deal with a number of
specified law enforcement situations.42
[15] Unlike other states, Maine’s statute is non-specific concerning
issues such as whether electronic recording is required, what must be
recorded (e.g. advice of rights) and what consequences, if any, exist for a
failure to record.43 For example, there is no mandatory exclusion
requirement or a provision for a cautionary jury instruction.44 The only
40

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2803-B (2009). In State v. Buzzell, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Maine rejected the defendant’s argument that a failure to record violated due
process. 617 A.2d 1016, 1018–19 (Me. 1992). It declined to follow Stephan v. State,
where the Alaska Supreme Court ruled that the due process clause of its state constitution
required the recording of custodial interrogation when feasible. 711 P.2d 1156, 1159–60
(Alaska 1985).
41

The policy states:
This agency recognizes the importance of recording custodial
interrogations related to serious crimes when they are conducted in a
place of detention. A recorded custodial interrogation creates
compelling evidence. A recording aids law enforcement efforts by
confirming the content and the voluntariness of a confession,
particularly when a person changes his testimony or claims falsely that
his or her constitutional rights were violated. Confessions are important
in that they often lead to convictions in cases that would otherwise be
difficult to prosecute. Recording custodial interrogations is an
important safeguard, and helps to protect the person’s right to counsel,
the right against self-incrimination and, ultimately, the right to a fair
trial. Finally, a recording of a custodial interrogation undeniably assists
the trier of fact in ascertaining the truth.

MAINE CHIEFS OF POLICE ASS’N, GENERAL ORDER, No.2-23A (2005),
http://www.nacdl.org/sl_docs.nsf/freeform/MERI_attachments/$FILE/ME_Police_Recor
ding.pdf.
42

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2803-B(3).

43

See id. §§ 2803-B, C.

44

See generally § 2803-B.
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consequence is a relatively minor civil penalty incurred by the police
agency that failed to record.45 Also, there are no specified exceptions to
the recording requirement that appear in other states, such as statements
made during routine booking questions, spontaneous statements, and
inoperable equipment.46 It would seem that each police agency has
substantial latitude to develop its own standards. Among the states
surveyed, Maine’s provisions are among the least stringent regarding
requirements and consequences.
D. Missouri
[16] Interestingly, passage of the Missouri statute is largely due to a
committee of prosecutors and law enforcement officials who, concerned
about the potential sanctions for non-recording as seen in other
jurisdictions, decided to be proactive and preempt any legislative or court
action by drafting legislation.47 This committee, while recognizing the
importance of recording interrogations, feared that a failure to act could
result in either the legislature or a state court creating an exclusionary rule
similar to ones found in other jurisdictions.48 In Missouri, there are no
significant penalties for failing to record a custodial interrogation.49
[17] Missouri requires that a member of law enforcement electronically
record the questioning of a person suspected of committing certain serious
offenses (such as murder, rape, and kidnapping), under circumstances

45

Id. § 2803-C.

46

See generally id. § 2803-B.

47

See generally Eric G. Zahnd, Missouri’s Experience With Recorded Interrogation
Legislation: Prosecutors Lead Effort to Pass Sensible Law, 43 PROSECUTOR 36 (2009).
48

Id. at 38 (discussing rules about the potential exclusion of non-recorded statements
found in Alaska, Illinois, Minnesota, New Jersey, North Carolina, Texas and
Washington, D.C.).

49

See MO. REV. STAT. §§ 590.700(5)–(7) (2009).
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traditionally defined as “custodial interrogation.”50 Missouri law also
provides for situations in which law enforcement is not required to record
an interrogation, including a request by the suspect not to record the
interrogation, spontaneous statements, equipment failure, and
emergencies.51 In addition, the statute requires that every police agency
create a written policy regarding the recording of such interrogations.52
[18] In Missouri, the statute specifically provides that a failure to
comply with the provisions does not constitute grounds for suppression.53
Moreover, a failure to comply may not be used as evidence during a
criminal trial.54 The only penalty provided in the statute allows the
governor to withhold funds earmarked for the non-compliant agency, if
the agency failed to act in good faith in its non-compliance.55 In State v.
Blair, the Missouri Court of Appeals first rejected the defendant’s
argument that a failure to record is a due process violation. 56 The court
referred to the pending Missouri statute, and observed that “this new
statute would not provide future defendants” a suppression remedy where
there has been a failure to record under circumstances requiring it.57
Therefore, the committee’s action appeared to have had the impact it
intended.

50

MO. REV. STAT. § 590.700(1) (defining custodial interrogation as “the questioning of a
person under arrest, who is no longer at the scene of the crime, by a member of a law
enforcement agency along with the answers and other statements of the person
questioned.”).
51

Id. § 590.700(3).

52

Id. § 590.700(4).

53

Id. § 590.700(6).

54

Id.

55

Id. § 590.700(5).

56

298 S.W.3d 38 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009); see also 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/103-2.1(e)(viii)
(West 2009).
57

Blair, 298 S.W.3d at 51–52.
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E. Montana
[19] Montana requires the electronic recording of all custodial
interrogations for felony offenses.58 The recording must include the advice
of rights.59 Moreover, as with most of the state statutes, there exist a
number of exceptions.60 The list is fairly typical and consistent with the
exceptions in other states. However, there is a significant escape hatch,
which allows for the admission of the statement if the prosecution can
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that “the statements have
been made voluntarily and are reliable . . . .”61 Thus, if the interrogation
passes muster under the traditional tests of voluntariness and is otherwise
reliable, the trial court shall admit it even though there is no recording.62
However, even under these circumstances, the judge is required to give the
jury a cautionary instruction regarding the failure of the police to record
the interrogation, if requested by the defendant to do so.63
F. Nebraska
[20] Nebraska requires the electronic recording of custodial
interrogations regarding certain designated felonies, such as sexual assault,
kidnapping, and child abuse.64 Nebraska defines “custodial interrogation”
in a manner that specifically tracks the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of
the United States Constitution, U.S. Supreme Court decisions, and similar
58

MONT. CODE. ANN. §§ 46-4-407 to 46-4-408 (2009). The statute states that “all
custodial interrogations must be electronically recorded.” Id. § 46-4-408. However,
“custodial interrogation” is defined as “an interview conducted by a peace officer in a
place of detention for the purpose of investigating a felony . . . .” Id. § 46-4-407.
59

Id. § 46-4-408.

60

Id. § 46-4-409.

61

Id. § 46-4-409(1).

62

Id.

63

Id. §§ 46-4-408, 46-4-410.

64

NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-4503(2) (2009).
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provisions of the Nebraska Constitution.65 Other provisions, including the
definitions for “electronically record” and “place of detention,” as well as
the exceptions to the recording requirements, are similar to those found in
many of the other jurisdictions.66 The law requires the recording of the
advice of rights and the waiver (if one is obtained), as do many of the
other jurisdictions surveyed in this Article.67
[21] Nebraska significantly differs from other jurisdictions in that a
failure to comply with the requirements of the statute requires the trial
court to “instruct the jury that they may draw an adverse inference for the
law enforcement officer’s failure to comply with such section.”68
[22] However, even if law enforcement personnel fail to record the
statement, the court may permit its use for impeachment purposes if the
statement was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily given.69 A jury
instruction is not required if the prosecution establishes by a
preponderance of the evidence that a “reasonable exception” existed for
not recording the statement.70 Finally, consistent with Miranda
jurisprudence, there is no “fruit of the poisonous tree” application as it

65

Id. § 29-4502(1).

66

Id. §§ 29-4502(2)–(4) (defining “electronically record” to mean “to record using an
audio recording device, a digital recording device, or a video recording device” and
defining a “place of detention” as “a police station, sheriff's office, troop headquarters,
courthouse, county attorney's office, juvenile or adult correctional or holding facility,
community correctional center, or building under the permanent control of law
enforcement at which the person is in custody pursuant to the authority of a law
enforcement officer.” Id. §§ 29-4502(2)–(3)).
67

Id. § 29-4501.

68

Id. § 29-4504.

69

Id. § 29-4504(1).

70

Id. § 29-4505(2).
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relates to derivative evidence, if the subsequently obtained evidence is
otherwise admissible.71
G. New Mexico
[23] New Mexico law is broad in application because it only requires
the electronic recording of custodial interrogations “when reasonably able
to do so” and only when “the person is suspected of committing a felony
offense.”72 Thus, law enforcement appears to have some flexibility in
determining whether to record. Consistent with the requirements in other
jurisdictions, law enforcement agencies are required to record the
complete custodial interrogation, beginning with the advice of rights.73
“Custodial interrogation” includes circumstances in which Miranda
warnings are necessary.74 Although recording is mandatory, a police
officer’s failure to comply can be excusable if “good cause” existed and
the officer created a “contemporaneous written or electronic record”
specifying the reasons for not recording.75 Additionally, there are no
penalty provisions for failure to record.76 In fact, the final section of the
statute provides that “this section shall not be construed to exclude
otherwise admissible evidence in any judicial proceeding.”77

71

See id. § 29-4506; see also United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 635–44 (2004);
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 301–05 (1985); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 445
(1974).
72

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-1-16(A), (D) (West 2009).

73

Id. §§ 29-1-16(A)(1), (3).

74

See id. § 29-1-16(H).

75

Id. § 29-1-16(B) (stating examples of good cause including situations when the
equipment was unavailable, where the equipment failed and replacement equipment was
not available, or when the suspect refused to be recorded).

76

See generally id. § 29-1-16.

77

Id. § 29-1-16(I).
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H. North Carolina
[24] In North Carolina, all police departments are required to
electronically record custodial interrogations pertaining to homicide
investigations.78 A unique feature of the North Carolina statute is the
requirement that the recording device capture both the suspect and the
interrogator.79 This statutory requirement would appear to be a reflection
of studies that demonstrate that it is important to position the camera on
both participants.80 The result is a more fair and objective evaluation of
the voluntariness of the interview. This is important because a failure to
capture the interrogator may lend itself to allegations by the defendant that
the interrogator intimidated him through off-camera gestures and facial
expressions.81
[25] The enumerated exceptions are generally consistent with those
found in other jurisdictions. They include spontaneous statements,
statements made during routine questions asked during the processing of a
suspect, statements made in open court, and statements made when the
police are not cognizant that the person interviewed is not a murder
suspect.82 Finally, consistent with most other jurisdictions, the police
department must keep the recording for one year after the exhaustion of all
appeals, including habeas corpus proceedings.83

78

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-211(d) (2009).

79

Id. § 15A-211(c)(2).

80

See Evelyn Mahoney, Interrogations, Confessions, and Videotape, 14 J. Politics &
Society, 117, 123 (2003), available at http://www.helvidius.org/files/2003/2003_
Mahony.pdf (citing G. Daniel Lassiter, et al., Videotaped Confessions: Is Guilt in the Eye
of the Camera?, 33 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 189–254 (2001)); see also
William Geller, Nat’l Inst. of Justice Research in Brief, Videotaping Interrogations and
Confessions (Mar. 1993) (on file with author).
81

Mahoney, supra note 80, at 123; see Geller, supra note 80.

82

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-211(g).

83

Id. § 15A-211(h).

15

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XVI, Issue 3

[26] A failure by law enforcement to record the entire interrogation
does not preclude admissibility of a subsequent recorded portion of the
interrogation; rather, this later recorded statement is open to a challenge as
to its voluntariness and reliability.84 In such circumstances, the prosecutor
has the burden of establishing by “clear and convincing evidence that the
statement was both voluntary and reliable and that law enforcement
officers had good cause for failing to electronically record the
interrogation in its entirety.”85 Good cause includes the recorded refusal
by the suspect to have the statement recorded and unforeseen equipment
failure.86
[27] If the state fails to record as required by the statute, the court is
required to consider this in connection with a motion to suppress.87 In
addition, upon a challenge of the interrogation, the court must consider the
failure to record as being involuntary or unreliable.88 Finally, the court
must instruct the jury that the failure of the police to record the
interrogation is a factor they may consider regarding whether the
statement was voluntary.89
I. Oregon
[28] Oregon’s statute becomes effective in two stages.90 As of July 1,
2010, recording is required for all custodial interrogations resulting from

84

Id. § 15A-211(e).

85

Id.

86

Id. §§ 15A-211(e)(1)–(2).

87

Id. § 15A-211(f)(1).

88

Id. § 15A-211(f)(2).

89

Id. § 15A-211(f)(3).

90

See 2009 OR. LAWS ch.488 (relating to custodial interrogations; creating new
provisions and amending OR. REV. STAT. § 165.540) (adopted June 24, 2009).
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certain offenses, such as aggravated murder.91 On July 1, 2011, the statute
will extend the recording requirement to include all major felonies that
carry a mandatory minimum sentence.92 The statute does seem to require
that the recording include the advice of rights.93
[29] Oregon’s law contains many of the same exceptions found in other
states’ statutes. Some examples are: statements made during routine
booking questions, spontaneous statements, statements provided to federal
law enforcement, and equipment failure.94 In what appears to be a unique
exception, the statute does not apply to an “agency that employs five or
fewer peace officers.”95 This exception is likely meant to relieve smaller
agencies of the costs associated with purchasing the recording equipment
and constructing the appropriate facilities.
[30] The Oregon statute prohibits courts from excluding a defendant’s
statement or dismissing criminal charges in spite of a violation of the
recording requirements.96 However, if the state cannot show by a
preponderance of the evidence, the existence of an enumerated exception
to the recording requirement, the court upon Defendant’s request “shall
instruct the jury regarding the legal requirement described in subsection
(1) . . . and the superior reliability of electronic recordings . . . .”97
Conversely, if the state records the statement, “the court may not give a
cautionary jury instruction.”98

91

Id.

92

Id.

93

See id. § 1(6).

94

Id. §§ 1(2)(a)–(i), (7).

95

Id. § 1(2)(g).

96

Id. § 1(3)(b).

97

Id. § 1(3)(a).

98

Id. § 1(3)(c) (emphasis added).
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J. Texas
[31] Under Texas law, “no oral or sign language statement of an
accused made as a result of custodial interrogation shall be admissible
against the accused in a criminal proceeding unless: (1) an electronic
recording . . . is made of the statement.”99 As with several other states,
such as Nebraska, authorities must record their efforts to advise an
individual of his rights and the individual’s waiver of those rights.100
However, as with virtually every other jurisdiction mandating electronic
recording of custodial interrogations, there is no requirement to record
conversations with the police that occurred prior to a defendant’s final
statement.101 The occurrence of a prior, unrecorded conversation may be
important information for a judge, if asked to consider a possible Fifth
Amendment violation, and a jury, since it is essential to view the final
recorded statement in the context of what may have previously occurred.
Additionally, signed written statements do not fall within the statute
because the statute is limited to “oral or sign language statement[s].”102
[32] Interestingly, the statute also provides the following unique
exception to the recording requirement:
Subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to any
statement which contains assertions of facts or
circumstances that are found to be true and which conduce
to establish the guilt of the accused, such as the finding of
secreted or stolen property or the instrument with which he
states the offense was committed.103

99

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22 §§ 3(a)–3(a)(1) (Vernon 2001).

100

Id. § 3(a)(2); see supra Part II.F.

101

See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22 § 3.

102
Id. § 3(a); see GEORGE E. DIX & ROBERT O. DAWSON, 41 TEX. CRIM. PRAC. & PROC. §
13.161 (2d ed. 2001).
103

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22 § 3(c).
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Thus, if a murder suspect, while subject to police questioning, states that
he left the murder weapon at an elementary school playground, the
statement is admissible if the weapon was later found as a direct result of
the suspect’s statement. Furthermore, the statement is admissible even if
law enforcement did not electronically record it, as required. In Robertson
v. State, the defendant claimed that his statement, taken while in police
custody, did not comply with Texas law because the police did not advise
him of his right to terminate the interview at any time.104 The suspect told
the police about his involvement in the robbery, disclosed that he had used
a stolen .38 caliber revolver and revealed where he had hidden the
weapon.105 Pursuant to the suspect’s statement, police found the gun.106
The court held that “[b]ecause the confession contains assertions of facts
which were found to be true and which help establish the appellant’s guilt,
the confession [is] admissible . . . .”107
[33] Another unique feature of the statute concerns the use of an
electronically recorded statement as part of a proceeding. The statute
dictates that if an individual untruthfully testifies regarding the facts and
circumstances concerning the recording, he “is presumed to have acted
with intent to deceive” and is subject to a perjury prosecution.108
[34] Texas law is generally consistent with other states as it relates to
those situations in which an electronic recording is not required (e.g.,

104

871 S.W.2d 701, 713 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).

105

Id. at 714.

106

Id.

107

Id.; see also Sendejo v. State, 953 S.W. 2d 443, 448–49 (Tex. App. 1997) (finding that
the defendant’s statements made to a police officer while in custody constituted facts
later found to be true and were therefore admissible under the statute); Romero v. State,
800 S.W. 2d 539, 545 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (finding that the defendant’s oral
confession made to police while in custody did not contain facts later found to be true and
was therefore inadmissible under the statute).
108

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22 § 4.
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voluntary statement).109 Except as noted above, a failure by law
enforcement personnel to adhere to the electronic recording requirements
bars the admission of a statement, unless one of the enunciated exceptions
applies.110 Unlike other jurisdictions, which either have no penalty for a
failure to comply (Missouri)111 or require the giving of an adverse jury
instruction (Nebraska),112 Texas law provides that if the requirements are
not met, “no oral or sign language statement of an accused made as a
result of custodial interrogation shall be admissible against the accused
. . . .”113
K. Wisconsin
[35] Wisconsin law requires the recording of custodial interrogation for
all felonies.114 There is no requirement to inform the suspect that the
police are recording his statement.115 The statutory exceptions are
generally consistent with those found in other states (e.g., routine
processing questions, spontaneous statements, equipment failure, exigent
circumstances, etc.).116
[36] If the police failed to make a recording as required by the statute
and the state fails to establish good cause for such failure upon request by
the defendant, the court is required to instruct the jury that the state’s
policy is to make an audio or visual recording of a custodial

109

Id. § 5.

110

See id. § 3.

111

See supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text.

112

See supra note 68 and accompanying text.

113

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 3(a) (emphasis added).

114

WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 968.073, 972.115 (West 2009).

115

Id. § 968.073(3).

116

Id. §§ 972.115(2)(a)(1)–(6).
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interrogation.117 The court will further instruct the jury that it “may
consider the absence of an audio or audio and visual recording of the
interrogation in evaluating the evidence relating to the interrogation and
the statement in the case.”118
[37] In several federal prosecutions, the defendants sought to challenge
the admissibility of their post-arrest statements because law enforcement,
including state officers, failed to record their statements as required by
state law.119 The court rejected their arguments in each instance because
there is no federal law enforcement counterpart to Wisconsin’s mandatory
recording provisions.120
II. JUDICIAL MANDATE
A. Alaska
[38] In the 1980 case of Mallot v. State, the Alaska Supreme Court
instructed law enforcement officials that “as part of their duty to preserve
evidence,121 it is incumbent upon them to tape record, where feasible, any
questioning and particularly that which occurs in a place of detention.”122
In 1985, the court mandated statewide recording of custodial
interrogations.123 In Stephan v. State, two defendants, Harris and Stephan,
117

Id. § 972.115(2)(a).

118

Id.

119

See generally United States v. Bruce, 550 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v.
Wilderness, 160 F.3d 1173 (7th Cir. 1998); United States v. Delaporte, 42 F.3d 1118 (7th
Cir. 1994); United States v. Haeuser, No. 08-CR-56, 2008 WL 4642250 (E.D. Wis. Oct.
17, 2008).

120

Bruce, 550 F.3d at 671–73; Haeuser, 2008 WL 4642250, at *10; see Wilderness, 160
F.3d at 1175–76; Delaporte, 42 F.3d at 1119–20.
121

Mallot v. State, 608 P.2d 737, 743 n.5 (Alaska 1980) (citing Catlett v. State, 585 P.2d
553, 558 n.5 (Alaska 1978)).
122

Id. (citing UNIF. R. CRIM. P. 243(b)).

123

Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1162 (Alaska 1985).
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were arrested on unrelated charges and interrogated by police officers at
the stationhouse.124 Harris was questioned twice and Stephan once.125
Both made inculpatory statements.126 In each case, the police had
recording equipment present, that they used during a portion of the
interviews.127 The officers were unable to offer adequate explanations for
their failure to record the interrogations in their entirety.128
[39] Both defendants moved to suppress their statements prior to trial
and, as is usually the case, there were disputes between the police and the
defendants as to what occurred in the interrogation rooms.129 In both
cases, the Alaska Court of Appeals found a violation of the Mallot rule but
rejected the application of an exclusionary rule.130 In Stephan, the court
acknowledged that, based upon prior decisions, there was uncertainty
regarding what should be the proper remedy when there is a failure to
record.131 Additionally, the Stephan court decided that “an unexcused
failure to electronically record a custodial interrogation conducted in a
place of detention violates a suspect’s right to due process under the
Alaska Constitution, and that any statement thus obtained is generally
inadmissible.”132 The recording must include the advice of rights.133 This

124

Id. at 1158.

125

Id.

126

Id.

127

Id.

128

Id. One officer testified that it was “normal practice” to first obtain a statement and
then record the confession. Id. at n.3.

129

Id. at 1158.

130

Id. at 1159.

131

See id. at 1163.

132

Id. at 1158.

133

Id. at 1162.
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recording requirement is necessary to help ensure the suspect’s right to
counsel, to protect against self-incrimination, and to protect the right to a
fair trial.134 This requirement only applies where the interrogation is
“conducted in a place of detention, such as a police station . . ., where it is
reasonable to assume that recording equipment is available . . . .”135 The
court issued a warning that it may extend the requirement of recording to
other venues if it finds that law enforcement is conducting interviews in a
manner designed to circumvent the requirement.136
[40] The court went on to hold that the exclusionary rule would apply
“only if the failure is unexcused.”137 It recognized that it cannot provide an
exhaustive list of excusable circumstances but does provide several
examples, including equipment failure and a suspect’s refusal to answer
questions once informed the police would be recording the
interrogation.138 As such, the trial court is to consider each circumstance
where the police did not record the interrogation.139 The state will be
required to satisfy the court pursuant to a preponderance of evidence
standard as to why the failure of the police to record is excusable.140
[41] Finally, the court observed that rigid application of the
exclusionary rule, when there has been a violation of the recording rule,
would be unreasonable.141 Failure to record a portion of the interrogation
does not necessarily bar the use of the suspect’s recorded statements “if

134

Id. at 1164.

135

Id. at 1165 n.33 (emphasis removed).

136

Id. (emphasis removed).

137

Id. at 1162 (emphasis in original).

138

Id.

139

See id.

140

Id.

141

See id. at 1165
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the unrecorded portion of the interrogation is, by all accounts,
innocuous.”142 For example, police officers may obtain statements, only
portions of which are recorded, before a violation actually occurs. The full
unrecorded statement is admissible despite a violation of the rule if there is
no evidence “that the statement is inaccurate or was otherwise obtained
improperly . . . .”143
B. Iowa
[42] Iowa encourages, but does not require, the police to record
custodial interrogations.144 In Hajtic, the court considered whether a
seventeen-year-old suspect made his confession voluntarily, knowingly,
and intelligently.145 His fourteen-year-old sister translated conversations
between the defendant’s mother and the police.146 Iowa’s juvenile laws
required that a parent consent to the juvenile’s waiver of Miranda
rights.147
[43] The court observed that the recording of the defendant’s
confessions assisted in the voluntariness determination.148 The court noted
that “[t]his case illustrates the value of electronic recording, particularly
videotaping, of custodial interrogations.”149 The court added that “the
videotape of Hajtic’s confession and the Miranda warnings that preceded

142

Id. (emphasis in original).

143

Id.

144

State v. Hajtic, 724 N.W.2d 449, 456 (Iowa 2006).

145

See id. at 451–52.

146

Id.

147

IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.11(2) (West 2010).

148

See Hajtic, 724 N.W.2d at 454.

149

Id.
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it clearly show that he understood the Miranda warnings given to him and
the questions asked.”150
[44] The Alaska Supreme Court’s adoption of an exclusionary rule and
the Minnesota Supreme Court’s mandate of electronic recording pursuant
to its supervisory powers significantly influenced the court’s decision.151
In addition, the Hajtic court cited the ABA provisions endorsing electronic
recording.152
C. Massachusetts
[45] Although Massachusetts does not require the police to
electronically record custodial interrogations, the state’s highest court

150

Id. at 456.

151

See id. at 454–55 (citing Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1160 (Alaska 1985); State v.
Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn. 1994)).

152

724 N.W.2d at 456. The ABA policy provides:
RESOLVED, That the American bar Association urges all law
enforcement agencies to videotape the entirety of custodial
interrogations of crime suspects at police precincts, courthouses,
detention centers, or other places where suspects are held for
questioning, or where videotaping is impractical, to audiotape the
entirety of such custodial interrogations.
FURTHER RESOLVED, that the American Bar Association
urges legislatures and/or courts to enact laws or rules of procedure
requiring videotaping of the entirety of custodial interrogations of
crime suspects at police precincts, courthouses, or other places where
suspects are held for questioning, or, where videotaping is impractical,
to require the audiotaping of such custodial interrogations, and to
provide appropriate remedies for non-compliance.

Id. (quoting N.Y. COUNTY LAWYERS’ ASSOC. AM. BAR ASS’N REPORT TO THE HOUSE
DELEGATES 1 (2004), http://www.abanet.org/leadership/2004/recommendations/8a.pdf).
The current ABA policy is available at http://www.abanet.org/leadership/2009/midyear/
recommendations/108.pdf.
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exacts a penalty when the police fail to do so.153 In Commonwealth v.
DiGiambattista, the court held that, under the totality of circumstances,
the defendant’s confession to arson was not voluntary.154 In particular, the
court was concerned about the interrogator’s use of trickery, implied
offers of leniency, and minimization.155 The court held that where the
police could have recorded the confession and failed to do so, the
defendant may request a jury instruction indicating that a failure to record
may be considered in determining whether the state has met its burden of
establishing voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt.156
[46] Despite its clear preference for recording, the court declined to
impose a “rule of exclusion,” given the existence of differing
circumstances and problems.157 The court cited several possible situations,
including non-custodial interrogations conducted at a police station and
non-custodial interrogations that turn into custodial interrogations.158 In
addition, any recording requirement would have to allow for justifiable
failures to record, as well as a situation in which the suspect insists that as

153

Commonwealth v. Diaz, 661 N.E. 2d 1326, 1328 (Mass. 1996).

154

813 N.E.2d 516, 528; see also SULLIVAN, supra note 11, at 6 n.11. See generally
Commonwealth v. Dagley, 816 N.E.2d 527 (Mass. 2004). Following this ruling, the state
Attorney General and District Attorneys Ass'n wrote in a Sept. 2006 Justice Initiative
Report: “Law enforcement officers shall, whenever it is practical and with the suspect’s
knowledge, electronically record all custodial interrogations of suspects and
interrogations of suspects conducted in places of detention.”

155

See DiGiambattista, 813 N.E.2d at 523.

156

Id. at 518 (“[T]he admission in evidence of any confession or statement of the
defendant that is the product of an unrecorded custodial confession, or an unrecorded
interrogation conducted at a place of detention, will entitle the defendant, on request, to a
jury instruction concerning the need to evaluate the alleged statement or confession with
particular caution.”).
157

See id. at 534.

158

Id. at 532.
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a precondition to an interview, he does not want the police to record his
interrogation.159
D. Minnesota
[47] In Minnesota v. Scales, the state’s highest court considered
whether a defendant had a due process right to have his complete custodial
interrogation recorded under the Minnesota Constitution.160 As an
alternative route, the court evaluated whether it could issue a mandate
requiring recordation based upon its supervisory powers.161 As part of its
analysis, the court reiterated its clear preference that recording a suspect’s
statements to the police would substantially aid lower courts in resolving
what took place in the interrogation room.162 The failure of law
enforcement to do so troubled the court.163
[48] Despite the court’s clear predilection and earlier warnings, the
police in Scales interrogated the defendant, who was a suspect in a
murder, for approximately three hours and did not record it.164 Thereafter,
the interrogation continued, but in a more formal question and answer
session.165 Police recorded the second interrogation.166 Before trial, the

159

Id. The last two circumstances consistently appear as justifiable excuses for a failure
to record.

160

518 N.W.2d 587, 589 (Minn. 1994).

161

Id.

162

See id. at 591.

163

See, e.g., State v. Robinson, 427 N.W.2d 217, 224 n.5 (Minn. 1988). In State v.
Pilcher, the court “urge[d] . . . law enforcement professionals [to] use those technological
means at their disposal to fully preserve those conversations and events preceding the
actual interrogation.” 472 N.W.2d 327, 333 (Minn. 1991). A failure to do so would cause
the court to “look with great disfavor upon any further refusal to heed these
admonitions.” Id.
164

State v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 590 (Minn. 1994).

165

Id.
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defendant challenged the truthfulness of the officers’ testimony, as well as
the adequacy of his Miranda warnings and his ensuing waiver.167 The trial
court rejected his argument and declined to rule whether the failure to
record was a violation of the state’s Constitution.168
[49] In deciding that recording a suspect’s statement is required, the
Minnesota Supreme Court looked favorably upon the Alaska Supreme
Court’s decision in Stephan v. State, which held that the failure by the
police to record a suspect’s custodial interrogation was a due process
violation under the state Constitution.169
E. New Hampshire
[50] In State v. Barnett, the defendant’s interrogation was in connection
with a sexual assault.170 However, police only recorded a portion of the
interrogation.171 Initially, the defendant denied molesting the young girls,
but after forty-five minutes, he admitted to the assault.172 Thereafter, the
defendant agreed to repeat his admissions for recording purposes.173 On
appeal, he claimed the trial court erred in admitting the recorded

166

Id. at 590.

167

Id.

168

Id.

169

The court also cited the Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure §130.4(3) and the
Uniform Rule of Criminal Procedure, both of which require the recording of custodial
interrogations conducted at detention facilities. Id. at 591–92 (stating that the Court
“chooses not to determine at this time whether under the Due Process Clause of the
Minnesota Constitution a criminal suspect has a right to have his or her custodial
interrogation recorded,” but requiring that all such questioning to be electronically
recorded); see Stephan, supra notes 123–25 and accompanying text.

170

789 A.2d 629, 630 (N.H. 2001).

171

Id. at 631.

172

Id. at 630–31.

173

Id. at 631.
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interrogation because it did not include his prior exculpatory statements.174
He argued that this was a violation of his due process rights under both the
New Hampshire and the federal Constitution.175
[51] The Supreme Court of New Hampshire disagreed.176 The court
began its analysis by looking at two other states that considered this issue.
The only state to require recordation of custodial interrogations as a due
process right is Alaska.177 The court declined to follow Alaska’s path and
instead looked to the Minnesota line of reasoning, where that court held
that a suspect possesses no due process right under the Minnesota
Constitution to have his or her custodial interrogation recorded.178
Consequently, the New Hampshire court invoked its supervisory powers
by requiring recordation of all custodial interrogations.179 The state’s
failure to do so results in the inadmissibility of the recording of the
interrogation.180
[52] The Barnett court carved out a decision that cuts between these
two states. Initially, it held that the advice of rights and waiver need not be
recorded.181 In addition, the police are not required to record all custodial
interrogations.182 Rather, it held that if law enforcement decides to record

174

Id.

175

Id.

176

Id. at 632.

177

Id. at 631–32; see Stephan v. State, 711 P.2d 1156, 1162 (Alaska 1985).

178

Barnett, 789 A.2d at 632; see Minnesota v. Scales, 518 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn.
1994).

179

Barnett, 789 A.2d at 632–33.

180

Id.

181

Id. at 632.

182

Id.
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a suspect’s interrogation, it must record the complete interrogation.183 The
penalty for failing to do so is the exclusion of the entire recorded
statement.184 However, unlike the rules in Alaska and Minnesota, “where
the incomplete recording of an interrogation results in the exclusion of the
tape recording itself, evidence gathered during the interrogation may still
be admitted in alternate forms, subject to the usual rules of evidence.”185
Thus, presumably, while the state would be prohibited from introducing a
partially recorded interrogation, the prosecution could still have the officer
testify as to what the defendant said in the interrogation room being a nonhearsay statement.186
III. RULE OF EVIDENCE
[53] Indiana’s recording rule requires that law enforcement
electronically record custodial interrogations for all felonies.187 However,
this requirement came about through an order of the Indiana Supreme
Court amending Rule of Evidence 617.188 Rule 617 requires recordation of
all custodial interrogations occurring in a place of detention, unless there
is the existence of an enumerated exception.189 The Rule tracks the

183

Id.

184

Id. at 632–33.

185

Id.

186

See N.H. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) (2009).

187

IND. R. EVID. 617 (effective Jan. 1, 2011), http://www.in.gov/ilea/files/Evidence_
Rule_617.pdf.

188

RANDALL T. SHEPARD, CHIEF JUSTICE OF IND., ORDER AMENDING RULES OF
EVIDENCE, No. 94S00-0909-MS-4 (2009), http://www.in.gov/ilea/files/Evidence_
Rule_617.pdf. Pursuant to the request of the Marion County Prosecutor’s Office and the
Indiana Metropolitan Police Department the rule “shall only apply to statements made on
or after January 1, 2011. Id.
189

IND. R. EVID. 617(a) (effective Jan. 1, 2011), http://www.in.gov/ilea/files/Evidence_
Rule_617.pdf.
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traditional definitions of “electronic recording,” “custodial interrogation,”
and “place of detention.”190
[54] The failure to record results in suppression of the statement, unless
the prosecutor can establish by clear and convincing evidence the
existence of an enumerated exception.191 The exceptions are those
typically found in the other jurisdictions and include statements made
during booking, a suspect who agrees to answer questions only if there is
no recording, malfunctioning equipment where there is no bad faith, and
spontaneous utterances.192 In addition, recording is not required where the
officer reasonably believes that the suspect’s questioning is in regards to
non-felonious conduct.193 The Rule does allow for non-recording where
there exists “substantial exigent circumstances.”194 There are no examples
of substantial exigent circumstances provided by the Rule.195
IV. COURT RULE
A. Maryland
[55] Maryland’s requirements are very limited and are contained in its
criminal procedure code.196 The statute merely provides that where a law
enforcement unit maintains rooms capable of electronic recording, they
should make “reasonable efforts” to record custodial interrogations in
cases involving murder, rape, and certain sexual offenses.197 It is
190

Id. at 617(b).

191

Id. at 617(a).

192

Id.

193

Id. at 617(a)(5).

194

Id. at 617(a)(7).

195

See id.

196

See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 2-402 (West 2009).

197

Id.
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essentially a policy statement; none of the requirements or consequences
found in many of the other statutes exists. For example, there are no
penalties or consequences if the police fail to record a murder suspect’s
custodial interrogation.198
B. New Jersey
[56] In 2005, New Jersey adopted a court rule that requires the
recording of all custodial interrogations in a place of detention.199 The
court rule is generally consistent with the statutory requirements
promulgated in other states. For example, it is limited to enumerated
felonies such as murder, kidnapping, and criminal sexual contact.200 In
addition, the exceptions are similar to those found in other jurisdictions.201
They include routine questioning, spontaneous utterances, a suspect’s
requirement that he will only answer questions absent a recording, and
interrogations conducted out-of-state.202 The state has the burden of
establishing by a “preponderance of the evidence” the existence of an
exception.203 These enumerated exceptions include circumstances where
the suspect is being interviewed for an offense that does not require
recordation and situations where the police are unaware the individual
being interviewed has committed an offense that requires recordation. 204
[57] Procedurally, the state has the burden of establishing an exception
by a “preponderance of the evidence” if it intends to use an unrecorded

198

See id.

199

N.J. CT. R. 3.17.

200

Id. at 3.17(a).

201

Id. at 3.17(b); see, e.g., supra note 192 and accompanying text.

202

N.J. CT. R. at 3.17(b)(i)–(vii).

203

Id. at 3.17(b).

204

Id. at 3.17(b)(vi)–(vii).
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statement.205 The state also must file a “notice of intent” specifying when
and where the unrecorded statement occurred and which applicable
exception(s) it is relying upon.206 Additionally, if requested by the
defendant, the state must provide the names and addresses of the witnesses
it intends to call to establish one of the specified exceptions.207
[58] The penalty for the failure to follow the rule is not necessarily
suppression of the statement.208 Rather, it is only a factor for the court to
take into consideration in determining the admissibility of the statement,
an issue for the jury as to whether the defendant made the statement, and
what weight, if any, to give to the statement.209 If a statement should have
been recorded, the defendant may request a cautionary instruction, which
the court is obligated to give.210
V. MODEL LEGISLATION
A. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
[59] The Electronic Recordation of Custodial Interrogations Act
(“Act”) requires the electronic recording of the entire custodial
interrogation, including the advice of rights.211 The Act requires the
recording of any “statement” made in response to police interrogation.212

205

Id. at 3.17(a)–(b).

206

Id. at 3.17(c).

207

Id.

208

See id. at 3.17(d).

209

Id.

210

Id. at 3.17(e).

211

NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, ELECTRONIC RECORDATION
CUSTODIAL
INTERROGATION
ACT
§
3(a)
(2009)
(Interim
Draft),
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/erci/2009nov_interim.pdf.
212

See id. § 2(1).
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The Act defines “statement” broadly, including both oral and written
statements.213 There is no requirement that the suspect know that the
police are recording her statement.214 Many of the specified exceptions are
similar to those found in the jurisdictions previously summarized (e.g.
exigent circumstances, spontaneous statements, routine booking questions,
a refusal by the suspect to allow police to record the statement, and
equipment malfunction).215
[60] If interrogation occurs for an offense not covered by the Act, no
recording is required.216 However, if during the questioning there is reason
to believe the responses by the suspect relate to a covered offense, the
officer should try to record the covered statements.217 If the state intends
to rely on a covered exception, it must demonstrate by a “preponderance
of the evidence” why the police failed to record the statement.218 In
addition, if the police failed to make a recording in circumstances where
they should have, the law enforcement officer may prepare a report
explaining his or her reasons.219 The state must provide the defendant with
notice if it intends to rely upon a recognized exception for not recording
the statement.220
[61] There are various remedies for a failure to record when the state
has failed to satisfy its burden regarding an applicable exception.221 The
213

Id. § 2(6).

214

Id. § 3(c).

215

Id. §§ 4–9.

216

Id. § 8(1).

217

Id.

218

Id. § 10.

219

Id. § 11(a).

220

Id. § 12(a).

221

Id. § 13.
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list of remedies includes a jury instruction, if requested by the
defendant.222 The Act also allows the admission of expert testimony
“about factors that may affect the voluntariness . . . of a statement made
during a custodial interrogation . . . .”223 The defendant must first establish
by a preponderance of the evidence that there are factors, not readily
apparent, which might influence the voluntariness and reliability of the
statement.224 Several examples include age, mental acuity, and
interrogation technique.225 No other jurisdiction surveyed included a
similar provision.
B. Innocence Project
[62] The model legislation proposed by the Innocence Project requires
law enforcement to record all custodial interrogations when they occur in
places of detention.226 This recordation requirement encompasses both
oral and written statements.227 It also requires the focus of the camera to
be on both the suspect and the interrogator.228 A failure to record results in
a presumption of inadmissibility that the state can overcome if the court
finds, for example, that the defendant made the statement voluntarily, and
it is reliable.229 Similar to other jurisdictions, a recording is not required if
222

Id. (“Those instructions must, at a minimum, explain to the jury that the police did not
electronically record the entire interrogation process, though the law required them to do
so, and that the jury is therefore, deprived of the most reliable and complete evidence of
what was said and done by each of the participants.”).

223

Id. § 13(c).

224

Id.

225

Id.

226

INNOCENCE PROJECT, AN ACT DIRECTING THE ELECTRONIC RECORDING OF
CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION §§ 2–3 (2008), http://www.innocenceproject.org/
docs/09_model_legislation/Electronic_Recording_Custodial_ Interrogations_2009.pdf.
227

Id. § 2(D).

228

Id. § 3(C).

229

Id. §§ 4, 5(B).

35

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XVI, Issue 3

the person refuses to be recorded.230 However, the refusal must occur after
consulting with counsel.231
[63] In addition, although many jurisdictions carve out exceptions for
statements made to a grand jury or in court, the Act requires the court to
find by “clear and convincing evidence” that statements in these venues
were made voluntarily.232 Another unusual feature is a “monitoring
requirement.”233 Under that requirement, the appropriate state committee
must monitor compliance with the recording requirements through
documents submitted by the court and prosecutor.234 The court and
prosecutor must submit these forms for cases where recorded
conversations were introduced into evidence, unrecorded interrogations
were introduced into evidence, or a guilty plea followed an
interrogation.235 Finally, the state committee must keep the recordings
until the conclusion of all appeals, including habeas corpus proceedings.236
VI. PROPOSED LEGISLATION
A. Michigan
[64] In 1998, the Michigan Court of Appeals in People v. Fike rejected
the argument that failure by the police to record a post-arrest statement
constituted a violation of the State’s Due Process Clause.237 The court
revisited the issue in 2004, and again rejected the defendant’s argument
230

See id. § 5.

231

Id. § 5(D)(2).

232

Id. § 6.

233

Id. § 7.

234

Id. § 7(A).

235

Id.

236

Id. § 8(B).

237

577 N.W.2d 903, 906–07 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998).
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[65] In 2007, Michigan House introduced a bill that would require law
enforcement to electronically record custodial interrogations in major
felony cases.239 The bill punishes violations by excluding any evidence
obtained absent a showing of “good cause” for not recording the
interrogation.240 The bill is still pending.241
[66] In 2006, the Michigan State Bar created a “Custodial Interrogation
Recording Task Force.”242 Its purpose is as follows:
[t]he State Bar of Michigan has appointed a
Custodial Interrogation Recording Task Force. The group
consisting of State Bar members in the criminal defense,
prosecution, judicial and law enforcement communities is
charged with developing and promoting legislative, court
rule, and funding changes that advance the use of audio and
video electronic recording of custodial interrogations. The
need for the task force arises from concerns about the
wrongful convictions of innocent people, and the amount of
time spent at trial and on appeal litigating who said and did
what during an interrogation.243

238

People v. Geno, 683 N.W.2d 687, 690 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004).

239

H.B. 4909, 2007-2008 Sess. § 7(1) (Mich. 2007), available
http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2007-2008/billintroduced/House/pdf/2007HIB-4909.pdf.
240

Id. § 7(4).

241

H.B. 4909, 2007-2008 Sess. § 7(1) (Mich. 2007).

242

at

State Bar of Michigan, New Custodial Interrogation Recording Task Force Formed,
May
16,
2006,
http://www.michbar.org/news/releases/archives06/interrogation_
taskforce.cfm.
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Id.
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[67] The current draft of the proposed bill is generally consistent with
the requirements of several other jurisdictions. It requires the recording of
custodial interrogations in “major felony” cases, which include crimes
punishable by life imprisonment and crimes for which the statutory
maximum exceeds twenty years.244 Law enforcement is required to record
the complete interrogation, including Miranda warnings.245 There is no
requirement that the individual have knowledge of or consent to the
recording.246
[68] A failure to record does not preclude the admissibility of a
statement if the court finds there was “good cause.”247 If the court does not
find good cause for the failure to record, the statement might nevertheless
be admissible; however, the court must instruct the jury that law
enforcement failed to record the statement as required by the statute.248
CONCLUSION
[69] The electronic recording of a suspect’s custodial interrogation has
greatly benefited the criminal justice system on both sides of the aisle. The
results have brought increased integrity to events taking place in police
interrogation rooms. The system benefits where a record of the process for
obtaining a suspect’s statement, including the advice of rights, is
preserved.
[70] From my experience, prosecutors and law enforcement are
generally supportive of mandatory recording. When recording of an
interrogation occurs, law enforcement is better able to question a suspect

244

H.B. 5763, 2009-2010 Sess. § 7(D) (Mich. 2010), available
http://www.legislature.mi.gov/documents/2009-2010/billintroduced/House/pdf/2010HIB-5763.pdf.
245

Id. § 8(1).

246

Id.

247

Id. § 9(1).

248

Id. § 9(2).
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and develop investigative leads because it greatly reduces the need to take
copious notes. A recording requirement also enhances the quality of a
prosecutor’s case. Recording custodial statements necessarily results in
more convictions through both guilty pleas and trials. A jury’s ability to
see and hear the defendant is very powerful incriminatory evidence. Better
community relations and a reduction in lawsuits against police officers are
indirect but significant benefits.
[71] From the defense perspective, mandatory recording better protects
the rights of suspects, especially if the recording requirement includes the
advice of rights. It eliminates the swearing contests – typically won by the
prosecution – that frequently accompany motions to suppress. It also
reduces the number of false confessions and deters police misconduct.
[72] From a judicial perspective, a recording requirement allows a court
to evaluate more carefully whether the police adequately advised a suspect
of his or her rights, as well assess the voluntariness of the statement. It
also reduces the workload of trial and appellate courts in resolving
confession-related issues. As one judge in the Eastern District of Michigan
observed in connection with a motion to suppress a confession:
[a]ffording the Court the benefit of watching or
listening to a videotaped or audiotaped statement is
invaluable; indeed, a tape-recorded interrogation allows the
court to more accurately assess whether a statement was
given knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.249
[73] As a former federal prosecutor, I tried, unsuccessfully, to create
relevant guidelines for the federal law enforcement agencies in the Eastern
District of Michigan. The district gave several reasons for rejecting those
guidelines, including concerns that imposing such a requirement would
reduce the number of confessions, be overly expensive, and otherwise
would inhibit law enforcement. Those reasons have not been borne out in
jurisdictions that require recording.

249

United States v. Lewis, 355 F. Supp. 870, 873 (E.D. Mich. 2005).
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[74] Although the states have enacted various penalties for failing to
record an interrogation, suppression of the statement, absent a showing of
good cause, is the most effective remedy. By contrast, a presumption of
involuntariness is not consistent with prevailing authority and erects too
high a barrier for the admissibility of a non-recorded statement.
Unfortunately, Congress has not enacted a recording requirement for
federal law enforcement. Without further federal or state action, this
beneficial tool for law enforcement cannot be realized.
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X
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X

Crimes of
Violence250

IL

X

Murder

IA

X

IN
ME

Not specified
X

All felonies

X

MD

X

Serious
crimes251
Murder, rape,
and certain
other sexual
crimes

MA

X

Not specified

MA

X

Not specified
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Potential Penalties for
Failure to Record
Statement inadmissible if
unexcused
Rebuttable presumption that the
statement was involuntary
Statements presumed to be
inadmissible
None specified
Statements are inadmissible absent
clear and convincing evidence of a
listed exception
No consequences as it concerns
admissibility of the statement
None specified
No rule of exclusion but the
defendant may request a jury
instruction
No rule of exclusion but the
defendant may request a jury instruction

The District of Columbia defines a ”crime of violence” as “aggravated assault; act of
terrorism; arson; assault on a police officer (felony); assault with a dangerous weapon;
assault with intent to kill, commit first degree sexual abuse, commit second degree sexual
abuse, or commit child sexual abuse; assault with intent to commit any other offense;
burglary; carjacking; armed carjacking; child sexual abuse; cruelty to children in the first
degree; extortion or blackmail accompanied by threats of violence; gang recruitment,
participation, or retention by the use or threatened use of force, coercion, or intimidation;
kidnapping; malicious disfigurement; manslaughter; manufacture or possession of a
weapon of mass destruction; mayhem; murder; robbery; sexual abuse in the first, second,
or third degrees; use, dissemination, or detonation of a weapon of mass destruction; or an
attempt or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing offenses.” D.C. CODE ANN. § 231331(4) (2009).
251
Maine does not define “serious crimes.” See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 2803B(1)(K) (2009).
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Potential Penalties for
Failure to Record
Statement inadmissible if the
violation is “substantial”252

MO

X

Murder and
other serious
specified
crimes253

MT

X

Felonies

No rule of exclusion but the
defendant may request a Jury
instruction

X

Murder and
other
specified
felonies

No rule of exclusion but the defendant may request a
jury instruction

Not specified

No requirement to record custodial
interrogations, however, if do so,
must record the entire interrogation
otherwise it is inadmissible.

Murder and
other
specified
felonies

No rule of exclusion but the defendant may request a
jury instruction

NE

NH

NJ

X

X

252

No rule of exclusion. The Governor
may withhold funds if the agency is
not in compliance

The Minnesota Supreme Court specifically avoided specifying when a failure to
record would be “substantial.” “This determination is to be made by the trial court after
considering all relevant circumstances bearing on substantiality, including those set forth
in . . . the Model Penal Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure.” State v. Scales, 518
N.W.2d 587, 592 (Minn. 1994). Quoting from the Model Penal Code, several of these
factors include the unlawfulness of the conduct, whether it was willful, the influence of
the violation on the defendant’s decision to make a statement, deterrence and whether
there are alternate remedies other than exclusion of the statement. Id. at n.5.
253
Missouri requires the recording of “[a]ll custodial interrogations of persons suspected
of committing or attempting to commit murder in the first degree, murder in the second
degree, assault in the first degree, assault of a law enforcement officer in the first degree,
domestic assault in the first degree, elder abuse in the first degree, robbery in the first
degree, arson in the first degree, forcible rape, forcible sodomy, kidnapping, statutory
rape in the first degree, statutory sodomy in the first degree, child abuse, or child
kidnapping shall be recorded when feasible.” MO. REV. STAT. § 590.701.2(2) (2009).
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Potential Penalties for
Failure to Record
No rule of exclusion
Failure to comply may result in the
inadmissibility of the statement.
The defendant may request a jury
instruction which the court must
give
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The court cannot dismiss charges
or otherwise exclude the
admissibility of the statement. The
defendant may request a jury
instruction, which the court is
required to give
The statement is inadmissible if
obtained as a result of custodial
interrogation
No rule of exclusion but the
defendant may request a Jury
instruction

